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Authoritarianism within party structures is recognized as a central feature of all
political parties in Turkey but used in a taken-for-granted manner. This article highlights the
necessity to examine the power relationship between the central and local party actors and
argues that the different incentive structures within political parties lead to different types of
party authoritarianism. Comparing the incentive structures of the Republican People’s Party
(CHP) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the article concludes that the CHP is





One of the widely recognized features of party organizations in Turkey is the
concentration of power at the central level. Several studies have elaborated on this
basic feature under the labels of “oligarchic tendencies” of parties, “highly disci-
plined party leadership,” and “overly centralized structures” and underlined the





 This article highlights the significance of micro-level explana-
tions for authoritarian party structures by examining the power relationship between
the central and local party actors. It argues that the differences in incentive
structures lead to different patterns in party authoritarianism, an analysis that is not
sufficiently revealed by macro-level explanations. Comparing the incentive
structures between the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)
and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), this
article shows that the CHP is close to an oligarchic type of authoritarianism and the




 In the former type, the voice
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negative incentives such as the threat of marginalization in the party. In the latter
type, the local party activists remain indifferent to the authoritarian party structure
as a result of receiving positive incentives that encourage their ideological commit-
ment and loyalty to the party leader. Understanding such different patterns in
authoritarian party structures in Turkey is functional in predicting the possibilities
for transitions from party authoritarianism to internal party democracy in the future.
 
Conceptualization of Authoritarianism within Parties
 
There is a general consensus that the parties in Turkey mostly possess the character-
istics of cadre parties, which are controlled by elite groups of party activists, rather




Furthermore, the main source of income for political parties in Turkey since the




 which make the parties
resemble cartel parties in which the leaders use public financing and expanded state




 In terms of electoral strategies,
some Turkish parties also show the features of catch-all parties whose major goal is
to maximize electoral support, yet not through interest aggregation but primarily




All these features imply the characteristics of centralized party structures in





itarianism within parties incorporates but is not only formed by party centralization.
There are two important features that make an authoritarian party structure different
from a centralized party structure. First, it takes into account the exclusiveness of
local party actors versus their inclusiveness in decision-making mechanisms in addi-
tion to the centralization of the locus of control. In this sense, party authoritarianism





party authoritarianism emphasizes the relational notion of power. A power relation-




In other words, power is not something owned by the party leader. Rather, the
party leader has power over the party activist because it is the values, skills, and
perceptions of that activist that allows the party leader to influence him. In this
respect, power becomes relational in party authoritarianism.
A commonly observed pattern within authoritarian party structures is the oligar-
chic control of the party organization by its leaders. For an organization to be
considered an oligarchy the authority needs to be, firstly, in the hands of a minority;
secondly, illegitimate; and thirdly, organized in a way that the wishes of the major-




 The word legitimacy resides in a
Weberian understanding, meaning that “[the] power is legitimate if and only if the




 In oligarchic authoritarianism,
then, the local party activists do not believe in the legitimacy of the party leadership.
Yet classifying all existing party organizations in Turkey within the definition of
oligarchy is likely to produce certain problems. The definition leaves out parties
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organization. In other words, what if that legitimacy is maintained through control-
ling the contentment of local party activists by distributing positive organizational
incentives that encourage loyalty to party leaders? What if the local party activists
believe in the power of the party leaders only because they are made to believe in it?
In this respect, this study emphasizes that authoritarianism within parties can be
maintained both by hegemonic or oligarchic means of power exertion. Before
explaining the micro-level factors that cause such variance in the power structures
of party organizations, first it is necessary to briefly outline how the macro-level
factors—political culture and institutional framework—mold authoritarianism
within party organizations in Turkey.
 




Turkish political culture has a significant impact on the development of authoritari-
anism within parties in Turkey. The formation of the first political party of the
Republic, the CHP, was similar to the path of the first parties in authoritarian
regimes in the Middle East. It found its origins in “its protest against foreign
enemies and absolutism, dealing less with seizing power than with redefining state




 an effort highly controlled by the elite
cadres consisting of military officials and civil servants. After the establishment of
the Republic in 1923, the same elite cadres led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded
the CHP, which became a political instrument to serve the general interest of the
society and foster modernization in social and political life. Although Western-style
competitive democracy was an important goal for the elite, there were hesitations to
introduce a multiparty system in Turkey within the initial phase of the newly estab-
lished Republic. Atatürk accepted, in principle, party competition, but not if it went





 Thus, the CHP alone played the role of establishing a responsible, though




 The dominant position of the party
elite became consolidated to protect the general interest, which was embedded in the




After the transition to the multiparty era in 1946, the newly emerged Democratic
Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) ended the one-party rule of the CHP by winning the
elections in 1950. Yet while the DP inherited the authoritarian organizational struc-
ture of the CHP, it failed to inherit the function of representing the general interest.
The DP was born within a fragmented peripheral society with no strong social
groups facilitating the development of group representation. Other later parties were




 Instead, it was the particularistic
interest representation, namely clientelism, which rose simultaneously with political
participation in Turkey. As Güne
 
[scedil] -Ayata argues, it is difficult to undermine the
claim that clientelism has played a functional role in the development of party








































Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), in the 1960s developed a wide network of clientelistic
relations between the central and local party leaders.
The failure of representing the general interest had high costs for political parties
in Turkey. The military, which had taken over the role of guarding the general inter-
est, interrupted party politics in Turkey through the military interventions of 1960,
1971, and 1980, leading to the closure of several parties. Yet such closures led to no
more than a change in the name and the label of each party. The organizational basis
of the parties hardly changed since the same local party leaders through the
unchanged clientelistic networks coordinated the parties on the ground. The power-
seeking central party leaders later used these clientelistic networks to consolidate








 No. 2820) regulates the estab-
lishment and organization of political parties in Turkey. The activities of political
parties were regulated by the Law of Associations until the mid 1960s. In 1965, the
first law on political parties was adopted within the framework of the 1961 Constitu-
tion. The current law is the product of the 1982 Constitution, which was enacted
after the 1980 military intervention. Several studies criticize the law and claim that
it is a reason why party organizations cannot show healthy development in Turkey.
It is usually underlined that the law strengthens the hierarchical party model and




 Yet the law’s effect on party authori-
tarianism must be understood together with the features of Turkish political culture.
When legal enforcements merge with the main characteristics of a party system
based on clientelistic networks rather than social group representation, it becomes
even harder to talk about intraparty democracy.
The law has three main effects on party authoritarianism. Firstly, it makes the
parties dependent on state revenues and creates a cartelization effect. As the parties
in government have the power to distribute and use state resources, the assumption
that the parties in power have the greatest access to the state’s financial resources,
and donations from groups becomes stronger. Cartelization in this sense firms up
the “stateness” of the parties, prohibits the development of alternative choices to





circumstances, in turn, empower the anti-democratic structures of political parties,
as the party leaders tend to care less about their accountability towards the party
members than for trading on state resources.
The law’s second negative effect is that it promotes the exclusiveness of the
process of candidate selection in political parties. Candidate selection is one of the
central defining functions of a political party in a democracy, and how it is managed





practice in almost all parties in Turkey is to have candidates selected by the central
executive committee, where the weight of the party leader is paramount. According
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primaries at the local level or to use the method of central voting in determining




 Many parties, in this respect, choose to determine
candidates based on the central party organization’s decision, which restricts the
rights of the local party activists to participate in the organization’s decision-making
process. Thus, the law leaves the most significant function of political parties,
candidate selection, in the hands of the party leader.
Thirdly, the law regulates all the organizational characteristics of the parties,
creating a standardized organizational model consisting of party conventions and
elected executive committees at the national, provincial, and district levels. It identi-
fies the function of internal party branches and defines the methods of intraparty
elections at all levels. In this respect, the law limits the alternative models of party
organizational structures, encouraging the development of a single hierarchical




The Law on Political Parties sets the institutional background of party authoritari-
anism through its effects based on cartelization, exclusiveness of the candidate
selection process, and the single hierarchical party model. However, the party actors
still have a key role in shaping authoritarian structures at the micro level, as it is they
who filter the institutional effect by interpreting the law in an anti-democratic
manner.
 
Authoritarian Party Structures: (Actor-Centered) Micro-Level Factors
 





 Yet the implicit treatment of power as though it were
an attribute of a person or group is a repeated flaw in common conceptions of
power. Understanding authoritarian parties in this form foresees an intransitive
power relation within their structures. In other words, the statement that “the party
leader has power” is vacant unless “over whom” is specified. Therefore, power must





party authoritarianism, the party leader has power over the local party activists only
because it is their values, perceptions, and skills that allow the party leader to
influence them.
In order to achieve their power-seeking goals, party leaders have to appeal to the
perceptions and motivations of the rank-and-file by distributing organizational
incentives. There are usually three main incentives for the members of a party orga-
nization: material incentives, in the form of either monetary proposals or concrete
offers for higher positions; solidary incentives, conferring prestige, status, or social
approval; and purposive incentives, attained through the achievement of certain




 Material, purposive, and solidary incen-
tives can be considered positive incentives in the form of tangible and intangible
awards offered to those who act in the group interest. In addition to positive incen-
tives, this article also considers the role that negative incentives play in authoritarian
party structures. Negative incentives are in the form of a punishment for those who





































Material incentives form the basis of the clientelistic networks in Turkey,
strengthening authoritarianism within party structures. These incentives are, in
Panebianco’s words, selective incentives, concrete organizational benefits that party




 In Turkey, material
incentives are usually distributed to local leaders of district party organizations.
Selection of delegates and local party chairs in district party conventions are two
significant examples of how material incentives work to this end.




) is comprised, at most, of 400
selected delegates. Delegate selection is assigned to the registered party members
according to the law, and any member may be appointed to carry out the selection




 In other words, the law does not require
formal delegate elections for the district party conventions and leaves the other
organizational details of the selection process to the party constitutions. In practice,
the delegate selection process is mostly undertaken under the control of the district
party organization’s leadership circle, which, in fact, works as the agent of the
central party leaders as a result of the material incentives they receive. Thus, the
person appointed to carry out the selection process in each neighborhood is mostly a
member of the local clientelistic network and seeks to find delegates in favor of the
local party leader. One district party organization member interviewed explained
this problem as follows: 
Basically, it is the district party leader who determines the delegates in the
conventions. Prior to the conventions, the delegates are invited to dinners and
feasts in a way to guarantee the vote. The elections during the conventions take
place in line with the party constitutions and the law because they are
controlled by the district election boards. It is the process before the conven-




Another example on how material incentives operate is found in the process of
selecting the executive committee members of the district and provincial party





 Yet in practice what is usually experienced is different: they are appointed
by the central party committee and then elected at the convention. Thus, in the
period between the appointment and the election of the local party leader, the
appointed local leader looks for the delegates whose vote will be guaranteed in
the convention.
A provincial party chair explained the process of how he was brought to his
current position as follows: 
After our previous provincial chair resigned as he had declared his candidacy
for the upcoming parliamentary elections, five people in the party demanded
the position of chairmanship for the provincial party organization. They were
interviewed by the central party committee. I was one of them and later on

































Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey
 
203
As this example shows, the central party leaders determine their own methods of
selecting the appropriate local chairs rather than leaving the decision to party
members. The appointed local chairs guarantee the power of the central party lead-
ers through acquiring material incentives. A district vice-chair explained how he
came to his present situation is another example is to this end: “It was the district
party chair’s decision to appoint me to the position of vice chairmanship. He consid-
ered who was more qualified in dealing with the issues of organizational administra-




These examples show the essence of the relationship between the central and
local party leaders based on material incentives. Yet distributing material incentives
is highly costly for the party leaders, and not all parties have access to the same
amount of material resources (i.e. political appointments, state subventions).
Contrary to the parties in government, the parties in opposition have restricted




In this respect, the party leaders must use different strategies to deal with potential
reactions coming from the local party members who are outside of the clientelistic
network: they either distribute negative incentives to repress different voices or
solidary and purposive incentives to keep the local members indifferent to authori-
tarianism and loyal to the leader.
The CHP and the AKP are two opposite examples in terms of their incentive
structures in Turkey. The CHP leadership, leading the opposition in public office,
received the reaction of local party leaders and members after the 2007 national
elections in Turkey. The leadership, in turn, has clung to repression through the use
of negative incentives. As the AKP is the party in governmental office, the extent of
material incentives distributed to local leaders is higher than that in the CHP. The
rest of the rank-and-file, on the other hand, is indifferent to the authoritarian party
structure as a consequence of receiving other types of positive incentives: solidary
and purposive. The variance in the incentive structures of these two parties, thus,
creates different patterns in party authoritarianism: oligarchic and hegemonic.
 
Authoritarianism within the CHP Organization
 









ismatic personalities, maintaining a strong control of the party organization at the
central level. Yet the party’s continual defeat in elections from 1950 until 1961 as
well as developments in domestic politics led to a major change within the party,
facilitating intraparty democracy. The defeat in the 1965 elections was particularly
important since it fostered discussions among all party members questioning the




 Bülent Ecevit’s leadership in 1970s
empowered the local party organizations in decision-making processes, shifting the




The 1980 military intervention had a devastating effect on the CHP, like all
political parties of the pre-1980 era. All parties were closed down and the previous



































Democracy Party (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP) was established to appeal to
the CHP support base in 1983. It was led by Erdal 
 
[Idot  ] nönü and later on merged with
the People’s Party (Halkçı Parti, HP) becoming the Social Democratic People’s
Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP). Ecevit did not take part in these develop-
ments. After 1987 he led his own party, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol




Following the removal of the ban on the political parties the CHP was re-
established in 1992, electing Deniz Baykal as its new leader, and it merged with the
SHP in 1995. Baykal had served as the Minister of Finance in 1974 during Ecevit’s
government and led the opposition movement within the SHP against 
 
[Idot  ] nönü.
Following his election as the leader of the CHP, he pursued a leadership marginaliz-
ing the role of local party organizations in decision-making processes both in candi-
date selection and in programmatic or ideological debates. Since then, whenever
there was a clear voice that questioned Baykal and his leadership circle, the means
of control have been highly coercive. In return, the local party members lost their
belief in the party leadership, which caused an illegitimate, oligarchic type of
authoritarianism within the CHP. The analysis of the CHP’s national party conven-
tion that took place in 2008 provides important insight to understand how such
authoritarianism occurs within the party.
The delegate selection process for the national party convention had to take place
following the CHP’s defeat in the parliamentary elections on July 22, 2007, when
several leaders of the provincial and district party organizations revealed their
dissatisfaction with the central party policies and the Baykal administration. One of
the most representative public opinion surveys on the parliamentary elections
demonstrated that among the CHP voters the percentage of the people who recog-
nized the need for a new party and the need for a new leader in solving Turkey’s




 The distrust for the
Baykal administration was therefore evident among voters. Following the outbreak




[scedil] li mayor, Mustafa Sarıgül, who, after the parliamentary elections, began making
statements in the media about his intentions to be the next CHP party leader and




He attempted to gather all the CHP opposition members under his leadership and
organized backdoor meetings with the provincial and district party chairs whose




 However, Sarıgül soon was expelled
from the party by decision of the party disciplinary committee.
The administrative boards of the local party organizations, which objected to the
decisions of the central party administration, also suffered for their opposing stance
by being marginalized within the party. One of the examples was the CHP’s provin-
cial party organization in Istanbul (CHP-Istanbul), whose chair and cadres were
removed from their positions soon after the parliamentary elections. A reason for
the rapid removal of the provincial party leaders in Istanbul was the CHP-Istanbul’s
strategic importance. Its influence was greater than other provincial organizations
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 One of the delegates at the Istanbul provincial convention explained it as
follows: 
The results of the provincial party convention in Istanbul will be 90 percent the
same as the results of the national party convention. One sixth of the number





Therefore, the central party organization appointed a new provincial chair to CHP-
Istanbul who would guarantee the reelection of Baykal as the party leader in the
upcoming national convention by making up his own team of supporters. Thus,
three months before the national convention, the Istanbul provincial convention did
not go beyond holding a formal election for the informally appointed chair. The
majority of the delegates had already declared their written support for the




The Istanbul provincial organization was not the only organization that was
subject to radical changes and replacements. The provincial party organization in
Izmir (CHP-Izmir), which had provided a strong support base for the CHP votes in
2002 and, to a diminishing extent, in the 2007 parliamentary elections, was another
example for the subjugation to the coercive strategies of the central party organiza-
tion. The resistance of CHP-Izmir against the central administration after the 2007
parliamentary elections brought about its own dissolution by being replaced with a
new provincial administration in favor of Baykal and his leadership circle. The
newly appointed provincial chair restructured not only the provincial administration
cadre but also many of the cadres in district party administrations. The district lead-
ers subject to marginalization protested against this change by gathering and unfurl-
ing banners titled “Our only fault has been to be with the CHP,” which received




As a result of several removals in the party, the delegates, who were to elect the
CHP’s leader in the national party convention, were selected from the informally
appointed local party administrations that were in favor of the incumbent central
administration. Moreover, Deniz Baykal was not only reelected as the party leader
but also the only candidate nominated to run for the party leadership. The other
three candidates were not able to receive the support of a total of 253 delegates




 Yet 1,016 out of 1,213 delegates in




An important reason for the CHP to have such a coercive pattern of authoritarian-
ism, observed in the 2008 national convention process, is based on its position of
being an opposition party. The CHP acted as the main opposition party in the parlia-
ment in the 2002–2007 term when the AKP was the single party in government. In
times of opposition, the party leaders may be more easily challenged by the local
party activists because their access to power resources such as state subventions and







































incentives is very limited. In order to maintain their legitimacy in the party, the lead-
ers are expected to replace the capital with the valuation of effectiveness, control
productivity in the party, and respond to the structured demands of the local activ-
ists. However, as the case of the CHP illustrates, in authoritarian party structures the
party leaders may choose to use negative incentives for their power-seeking aims at
the expense of legitimacy.
If coercion within a party organization reaches this level, it is plausible to ask
what would continue to motivate a local party member to actively work for the
party. For instance, one of the ex-provincial chairs of the CHP stated upon his
removal that his administration never engaged in behavior that would do harm to the





 Furthermore, one of the local party members made the following statement
about the CHP: 
I was a member of the SHP before the merger between the CHP and the SHP.
I strongly believe in the principles of the Kemalist doctrine, secularism, and
republicanism.… There is authoritarianism within the CHP but my beliefs are





Another local CHP member explained his motivations to be within the CHP as
follows: 
Between the years 1997–1999, I was affiliated with a radical left-wing party
but then I realized that for my struggle to be meaningful and legal, I changed
my affiliation and began to work for the CHP.… I think that the CHP is an
unsuccessful party. We need a democratic structure to be successful and appeal
to the people. Within the current structure, our opinions are not valued. The
reason why we are here today is because we have an emotional bond with the




Another statement from a different local party member, showing his attachment to
the CHP is as follows: 
The candidate selection process is anti-democratic in our party. We are not
satisfied with this process as well as with the selected candidates but since they
are the candidates of our party, we must support them. By the same token,





These exemplary statements show that the rank-and-file of the CHP are holders of
strong ideological motivations. The negative incentives—the threat of marginaliza-
tion—do not deter them from being members of the party. Many party members do
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authoritarianism within the CHP has an oligarchic nature; the power of the central
party elite is illegitimate and maintained through the supply of negative incentives
to the local party members who are ideologically attached to the party.
 
Authoritarianism within the AKP Organization
 
The only party that deviated from the patterns of cadre, catch-all, and cartel parties
in the Turkish party system is the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), one of the




 was composed of
very strong grassroots organizations and emphasized the community and family




 Not only did the party have
strong ties with the local volunteer groups and organizations but the strong ideolog-
ical attachments of its members made the RP resemble a mass-party model.





ru Yol Partisi, DYP), Erbakan was accused of undermining the
Republic’s principle of secularism and was forced to resign by the military-domi-
nated National Security Council in 1997. The RP, closed down by the decision of
the Constitutional Court, was then replaced by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP)
with the same support base but a new leader, Recai Kutan, who was Erbakan’s loyal
friend. It was when some reformist cadres within the FP emphasized the need for a
modern party identity that the party split into two main factions. The traditional
faction supported the idea of sustaining the communitarian dimension of the party
whereas the reformist faction wanted to build a modern type of conservative party.





an, the former mayor of Istanbul. In the 2002 national elections, the
newly founded AKP, by gaining 34.5 percent of the votes and dealing a severe blow
to parties that were in power in a coalition government, emerged as the dominant




 the other parties, particularly
the main opposition party, the CHP, was also reassured in the 2007 national elec-
tions in which the party received the 46.7 percent of the votes.
The AKP rejected its bonds with the RP and the FP, identifying its ideology as the
modern version of “conservative democracy.” Based on an interview conducted
with the vice-chair of the AKP, Özbudun asserts that the AKP party members do not




 He also argues that the





 However, resemblance to a mass party model does not neces-
sarily bring intraparty democracy. As in all Turkish political parties, the central
party leaders within the AKP exercise paramount influence within the whole organi-
zation although the AKP party constitution brings forth three methods of candidate





) takes place when the central party committee asks
the opinions of the local party organizations about the candidates, but it is still the




) is, on the





































again the central committee that decides which method of candidate selection is to




The AKP determined its candidates for the 2007 national elections mainly
through the methods of organizational and central enquiry. However, contrary to
the CHP elite’s strategy of coercion to dominate the decisions, the AKP elite did
not need to repress any voices since the party members were usually indifferent to
authoritarianism. Rather, a number of positive incentives (material, solidary,
purposive) given to the local party members helped consolidate authoritarianism
within the party. An important reason why these incentives work successfully in
the case of the AKP is the party’s access to significant power resources, in
contrast to the CHP case. Having acquired governmental office as a single party
after both the 2002 and 2007 elections, the AKP has control over the most impor-
tant public offices. The party also receives the highest financial share from the
state subventions due to the high proportion of the votes it received in these elec-
tions. Allocating 30 percent of the party budget to the local party organizations





authoritarianism further becomes consolidated within the AKP. As for the other
local party members, solidary and purposive incentives are sufficient for being
loyal to the party leader. The opinions of members on the candidate selection
process provide important insights in this regard. For example, one district party
member stated that: 
Of course, our party leader should have the weight in the candidate selection
process. We would not be working for the party unless we believed in our
leader’s decisions. I have not been affiliated with any party until the AKP. Our




Another district party member did not hesitate to criticize the AKP’s candidate
selection process but his thoughts on authoritarianism within the AKP were surpris-
ingly at odds with his statement on candidate selection: 
I really hope to see primaries in the future in candidate selection processes. In
the last election, the candidate supported by our district was placed in the 24th
rank in the list of the MP candidates although the party gained 55 per cent of
the votes in this district. As a result of this high percentage, we think it is our
right to decide on the rankings among the candidates.… I do not think
authoritarianism is present in our party. Our leader values our opinions. If we
particularly compare our party with other parties, ours is democratic, we
complete opinion surveys that are evaluated.58
The agenda of the surveys that the local party members complete within the AKP
varies from candidate selection issues to other strategic party decisions. For
instance, regarding the surveys about the parliamentary candidates in the 2007
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The surveys that the central party committee carried out during the candidate
selection process contained questions like what a parliamentarian should be
like and where he or she should be from. There were no suggestions or names
of the possible MP candidates on the surveys. But the central party committee
took our thoughts into consideration, and I am happy with the results.59
According to these statements, the central party leaders make the final decision on
the candidate selection issues within the party organization. However, the survey
technique provides solidary incentives to the local party members as it makes them
feel more involved in the party decisions and think that their opinions are valued, no
matter how influential the surveys are.
Another solidary incentive that the party leadership provides to local members is
the sense of being a part of the process to serve to the country. Here are some typical
statements by party members in this regard: 
I did not have any relations with a party before the AKP. One day, I witnessed
the speech of our prime minister on television; he made a call to us stating that
we should all come together, working for one end. I asked myself, “Why
should I not be with the AKP?” Since then, I have worked as a party member
within the AKP. It has been three years. Besides, it is a party of service and I
want to be a part of this service for the country.60
The AKP serves a country that was on the edge of falling from a cliff. I do not
support any ideology. I do not think the party has any ideology. I even do not
see it as a party, it is an entity established to serve the people. This is the reason
why I work for the AKP today.61
I believe that the AKP is the only party that works for the benefit of the country.
Its cadres are full of potential. It offers concrete projects and spends effort to
achieve the goal of civilization. It has not confronted any failures yet. The
social and economic activities that the party carries out have always been
successful.62
The reason why I became a party member is easy to explain. It strengthens
human relations, first of all. Being a party member is more effective than being
a member of a non-governmental organization in terms of these human rela-
tions. My daily schedule is always full. And the AKP’s vision overlaps with my
motivation.63
I have been a member of this party since its establishment in 2001. I did not
have any affiliation with any party before. The reason why I chose the AKP is
that I had sympathy for the party leader. When Erdo[gbrev] an established his own

































In fact, it was the party leadership that popularized the term “service for the
country” inside and outside the party. During the 2007 electoral campaigns, the
AKP emphasized its identity as being a “service party” by repeatedly underlining
the slogan, “Let’s continue the journey without ceasing!”65 and underlining its
record of economic stabilization as well as infrastructure development in rural
areas.66 On the other hand, local women activists’ close ties with the charity organi-
zations through the party further increase their sense of serving the poor and the
disadvantaged people.67 Thus, the local party members are usually content with the
solidary incentives such as filling out party surveys and “serving the country,”
which they see as the benefits provided and made possible by the party leaders. Yet
this contentment leads to a lack of concern among those who make the decisions in
the party. In this respect, the authoritarianism within the AKP is not illegitimate yet
close to a hegemonic type of authoritarianism where the majority shows consent to
the domination of the minority.
Conclusion
Understanding the power structures of party organizations is essential in assessing
the quality of democracy in a political system. Yet due to the taken-for-granted
nature of authoritarianism within party organizations in Turkey, internal power
structures of parties have received little attention. This article has suggested that it is
necessary to pay attention to the micro-level dynamics within party organizations to
understand different patterns of authoritarian power structures and even the
potentials for transition from party authoritarianism to intraparty democracy.
At the macro level, party authoritarianism is embedded in Turkey’s political
culture and institutional framework. Local party activists are subordinate to deci-
sions made by party leaders in candidate selection and policy formulation processes
even if these decisions are contrary to their interests. Yet it is also possible to see
different patterns of authoritarianism—hegemonic and oligarchic—across parties as
elaborated in the cases of the AKP and the CHP.
In order to explain this difference, this article has emphasized the need to treat the
concept of power as a relational phenomenon in authoritarian party structures.68 In
other words, power is not something that is owned by the party leader but exists in
the relationship between the dominating (party leader) and the subordinate actors
(party activist). The dominating leaders must take into account the perceptions and
motivations of the subordinate activists to pursue their power-seeking aims. These
motivations are the basis for different incentive structures within the parties, affect-
ing the nature of the power relationship.69 In the oligarchic type of authoritarianism,
as observed in the CHP case, the activists who are motivated in challenging party
authoritarianism receive negative incentives and are therefore subject to marginal-
ization. In the hegemonic type of authoritarianism, as observed in the AKP case, the
activists are indifferent to the power structure and far from challenging the
authoritarian behavior of the party leaders because of receiving sufficient amounts
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Given this analysis, two final questions with future implications are raised: Is it
possible to foresee any possible exits from authoritarian party structures? Which
pattern of authoritarianism is more likely to develop into a democratic party struc-
ture? First of all, it seems that electoral defeats and being in the opposition generate
a trigger for change in parties’ incentive structures. For instance, following the elec-
toral defeat in 2007, the legitimacy of the CHP leader declined in the eyes of the
party activists in Turkey. As the party in opposition, on the other hand, the CHP
leadership did not have sufficient material resources to control the internal support.
Unsatisfied with the elite cadres of the party organization, the party activists had the
motive to challenge the authoritarianism. Such an attempt in an authoritarian party
structure has the potential to develop into a democratic one because the process
involves a trigger for change. Yet the CHP case has shown that the party activists
who initiated the challenge against the top leadership were subject to marginaliza-
tion by removal from their power positions in the party. The coercion exerted by the
leadership through negative incentives, in turn, strengthened the oligarchic control
of the party organization, leaving no possible chance for democratization.
Contrary to oligarchic authoritarianism, the hegemonic type of authoritarianism
does not contain a trigger for change. The submission of the party activists is either
purchased through material incentives or maintained by solidary and purposive
incentives that strengthen commitment to the party leader. It is not possible to see
any observable conflict between the party leaders and the party activists in
hegemonic authoritarianism. For instance, receiving the majority of votes and acting
as the single party in government after the 2002 and 2007 elections in Turkey, the
AKP had great access to material resources, which were allocated to the local chairs
and leaders in several district party organizations, leaving no incentive to challenge
the authoritarian nature of the candidate selection process during the 2007 national
elections. Similarly, the local activists did not question the process as a result of
receiving solidary and purposive incentives, which persuaded them to be loyal to the
leader’s decisions within the party. The indifference of the activists toward power
structures thus makes the chances for internal party democratization less likely.
Even though the differences in the incentive structures lead to different patterns
of party authoritarianism, neither of these patterns is likely to produce internal party
democracy in Turkey in the near future. Internal party democracy is likely to emerge
in structures where conflicting interests between the party actors are present and the
party leaders respond to these conflicts in a compromising manner. Yet the coercive
behavior of the party leadership in the CHP and the absence of conflicting interests
in the AKP fail to provide these sufficient conditions.
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